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Abstract 
 
This paper constructs a model of long-run performance for SMEs that have received 
venture capital backing.  The model explains performance by financial structure.  
FAME data are used for estimating performance equations over the period 1989 to 
2004 for UK businesses in their post-investment period. The econometrics uses robust 
techniques, including least absolute error (LAE) and Tukey trimean estimation.  It is 
shown that the key determinants of performance (measured by ROSF) are profit 
margins and risk, with lesser, but significant, roles played by liquidity and gearing.  
The sample is used to identify consistently high performers, and chronic low 
performers.  From the latter group, two detailed case studies illustrate how chronic 
low performance can emerge, in each case caused by failure to achieve technological 
milestones, and thereby failing, ultimately, to convince investors of potential 
company worth. 
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Realities of Long-Term Post Investment Performance  
for Venture-Backed Enterprises 
 
Gavin C Reid
 
and Julia A Smith 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
This is a quantitative paper, supported by case study evidence, which focuses on the 
post-investment performance (cf. Murray and Marriott, 1998) of long-lived SMEs 
which have acquired venture capital (including private equity) funding over the long 
term.  Performance is measured by rate of return on shareholder funds.  Least absolute 
errors statistical methods, and other techniques of robust regression methods are used 
to develop methods of performance which focus on financial structure.  Building on 
this, classes of consistently high, and persistently low, performance are identified.  By 
longitudinal analysis, it is shown that, from the long run standpoint, some well-known 
UK companies, often high technology companies, in which investment has been 
heavy, have proven to be poor long-term investment propositions.  Two case studies 
of Scottish high-technology companies illustrate this finding. 
 
2.  Methodology 
The key proposition is:  venture capital investment has a positive long run impact on 
the performance of investee firms (Arundale, 2002, Engel, 2004, Fisken and 
Rutherford, 2002, Wang and Ang, 2004).   This hypothesis is to be challenged by the 
data gathered and analyzed.  The method adopted in this paper is (a) to seek a robust 
model of performance over the long-term; (b) to identify consistently high, and 
persistently low, performers in a sample of long-lived SMEs which have enjoyed an 
infusion of venture capital early in their company history; and (c) to illustrate the 
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morphology of low performance with two case studies.  Our work extends previous 
research undertaken on strategies and techniques for venture investing (cf. Freel, 
1999, Kaplan and Stromberg, 1982, Mitchell et al, 1995, 1997, 1999, Sapienza et al, 
2000, Schefczyk, 2001, Wright and Robbie, 1996).   
   The method adopted uses data from the FAME database, which permits a 
longitudinal tracking of firms.  This database provides evidence on many key 
financial variables, and also a continued history of evolution by risk class.  Our own 
dataset construction involved two main activities:  first, tracking companies through 
changes in name and/or company form; and, second, classifying firms found to be 
dormant, in receivership or liquidated.  Changes were carefully traced and noted 
through use of the UK Companies House and FAME databases; and a separate 
variable for dissolved organizations was introduced to the database. The data used for 
performance analysis included:  turnover, profit (or loss) before taxation; net tangible 
assets; shareholders funds;  return on shareholders funds; return on capital employed; 
liquidity; gearing; and employees.  In addition, where available, credit assessment 
measures were also gathered.  Using these data, performance equations were 
estimated, using robust statistical methods based on regression quantiles.  
Econometric estimation was undertaken using Shazam software.  Finally, a data 
search was used to distinguish between high and low performers, over the lifetime of 
the sampled companies (cf. Bollingtoft et al, 2003).  
   Case studies used to illustrate the findings involve two famous companies: 
Pharmaceutical Proteins, which specialized in transgenic technologies, and was the 
first to clone an animal (Dolly the Sheep); and Shield Diagnostics, which specialized 
in in-vitro diagnostic products, and originally sought cheap diagnostic test procedures 
for AIDS, before shifting interest to other diagnostic areas, including the detection of 
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syphilis, diabetes and coronary heart disease.  Though attracting large volumes of 
venture funding, and creating much novel intellectual property, these companies are 
shown to have been poor long run investment propositions (cf. Robinson & Min, 
2002).  At the same time, we note (Reid and Smith, 2003) that it is possible to find 
less well known companies (like KPOS, which produces ‘point of sale’ software for 
retail businesses), which are still information and human capital intensive, but are not 
development companies, can have very good long term performance (Bouresli et al, 
2002, Jain and Kini, 1995, Zucker et al, 2002).  
   Previous research findings on the impact of venture capital investment on the 
performance of investee companies are equivocal.  At one end of the spectrum, are 
studies by Zucker et al (2002), Jain and Kini (1995), Keeley and Roure (1990), and 
Ammons (2000) which argue that there is a positive, if complex, relation between 
venture capital intervention and investee performance. On the other hand, studies by 
Flynn and Forman (2001), Hamilton (2001) and Gersick (1994) find that the 
performance relationship between the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is 
contingent and endogenous. It depends on the stage of investment; and venture 
capitalists and entrepreneurs can themselves affect performance in different ways (cf. 
Higashide and Birley (2002), Shepherd et al (2005), Sweeting and Wong (1997).   
Both effects can have a negative impact on performance.   
   Our study aims to resolve these opposing bodies of opinion.  Our general findings 
suggest rejecting the key proposition in its strict form.  The work serves as a 
corrective to the view that low-performing high technology firms are only a dot.com 
meltdown phenomenon.  Our study finds that firms founded well before this period in 
the early 2000s often lacked superior performance (cf. Arundale, 2002, Fisken and 
Rutherford, 2002).  This does not mean they will not make better returns in the future, 
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and does not imply irrelevance of such companies to the ‘business ecology’ of an 
advanced information intensive economy (e.g. in terms of positive spillover benefits).  
It does mean that venture capitalists with quite short time horizons will be unlikely to 
harvest the full benefits of such companies. 
 
3.  Data and Analysis 
The data on which the analysis is based relate to 31 companies which had received 
venture capital investment, and whose Directors were interviewed either face-to-face 
or by telephone interview in 1994 (Reid, 1998).  They covered a broad range of 
industries, from funeral directors to radio stations, computer recognition systems to 
biotechnology research, and hotel management to clothing manufacture.  For this 
paper, new financial data on these companies were gathered from the FAME1 
database for each year from as early as 1989 (where relevant and available) to 2004, 
inclusive.  Nominal financial data were deflated to real terms (1989 = 100) using the 
National Statistics’ Retail Price Index.  Descriptive statistics for key financial 
variables used in our analysis are contained in Table 1 below, and variable definitions 
are contained in the Appendix. 
   A total of 327 observations on the sampled companies are potentially available for 
any one variable.  However, each variable has missing data, and these lacunae vary 
across variables.  This reduces the potential sample size for econometric estimation 
somewhat.  The Profit Margin variable (N = 195) has the most missing data, so the 
effective sample size is typically around N = 150 for the econometric estimates 
reported upon below - certainly adequate data for serious inferential work. 
 
                                                 
1 Financial Analysis Made Easy 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables (see Appendix for definitions) 
Variable N µ σ Min Max 
Profit Margin 195 3.39 19.05 -89.35 59.28 
ROSF 229 18.26 137.76 -944.64 540.73 
ROCE 256 17.42 107.88 -975.52 540.73 
Liquidity 299 1.76 2.12 0.0700 19.91 
Gearing 251 164.47 404.61 0.0200 3853.4 
Employment 256 251.06 322.36 3.000 1703.0 
Qui Score 306 54.745 23.97 1.000 96.00 
Qui Rating 263 52109.0 35955.0 534.0 1×105 
 
 
   The first thing to observe from Table 1 is that some companies have a very poor 
financial showing over the sample period.  To illustrate, the mean (µ) profit margin 
over the period is only 3.39%, and the minimum is almost – 90%.  Both return on 
shareholders’ funds (ROSF) and return on capital employed have impressively high 
(and similar) mean (µ) values at 18.26% and 17.42%.  This befits returns in the high 
risk/ high returns area.  Reflecting this risk, very large negative values of these returns 
variables are possible in any given year, so the high positive average values are that 
much more remarkable.  Under some accounting conventions ROCE and ROSF will 
give identical values, this being true of the maximum value in each case of 
approximately 540%. 
   Indeed, for positive values, both ROSF and ROCE are quite close in the sample.  
Thus, a graphing of these values (not shown) shows them to be closely clustered on, 
and about, a 45° line in the first (positive) quadrant.  In the third quadrant (ROSF < 0, 
ROCE < 0) the picture is rather different, with a tendency for ROSF to be much more 
sharply negative than ROCE.  For this reason, the overall correlation of ROCE and 
ROSF is not very high for the sample as a whole (N = 228), though it is highly 
statistically significant (e.g.  for a linear regression of ROSF on ROCE; 
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prob. value = 0.000).  Given the similar behaviour of ROSF and ROCE, we have 
chosen to focus on just ROSF in undertaking performance estimates and reporting.  
The results are very similar when ROCE is used as a rate of return variable. 
   The basic model to be reported upon here (cf. Chang et al, 2003, Claessens et al, 
2000) has the general form: 
 
 Performance = f(Financial Structure) (1) 
 
   In this paper, the specification of (1) that will be used is: 
  
 ROSF = f(Profit Margin, Liquidity, Gearing, Security) (2) 
 
   These variables are all defined in the Appendix.  ROSF, Profit Margin, Liquidity 
and Gearing are defined in conventional ways (cf. Asthana & Lipka, 2002).  What is 
described here as ‘security’ is actually the inverse-risk measure as calibrated by the 
Qui Score.  This proprietary risk measure runs from 0 (high risk) to 100 (highly 
secure).  It is, in effect, a measure of the likelihood of company failure (cf. Beaver, 
2003, Headd, 2003, Bunn & Redwood, 2003). 
   The model of equation (2) is to be estimated by robust regression techniques, rather 
than regular least squares regression techniques, which are vulnerable to problems of 
outliers and specification error (e.g. non-normality of disturbances).  The general 
estimation technique adopted uses regression quartiles (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  
The minimand for this technique is: 
  (3) 
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which is the θth sample regression quantile for 0 < θ < 1, for which the solution is 
some )(ˆ θβ .  When θ = 0.5 this reduces to the least absolute errors (LAE) estimator, 
for which the β sought are those which minimise ∑ − βXy .  As usual, y is a set of 
observations on the dependent variable, X is a metric of observations on the 
independent variables, and the operator  .  denotes absolute values.  Computation is 
by linear programming, using the simplex method (Wagner, 1959). 
   Table 2 reports on LAE estimation, in which 153 of the available 327 observations 
were usable.  For this sub-sample, the mean value for the return on shareholders’ 
funds (ROSF) was approximately 24%.  All coefficients are highly statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 2:  Dependent Variable: Return on Shareholders’ Funds (ROSF) 
Independent Variables βˆ  t-ratio Elasticity 
Profit Margin 3.542 32.92*** 1.011 
Liquidity 4.924 4.602*** 0.295 
Gearing -0.0364 -5.096*** -0.152 
Qui Score -0.489 -6.214*** -1.287 
Constant 25.173 5.662*** 1.046 
 
***Significant at 1% level (148 d.f.) 
Mean of ROSF = 24.074 
 
   Not surprisingly, the profit margin has a relatively large proportional effect on the 
ROSF.  A 10% increase in the profit margin will raise the ROSF by approximately 
10% as well.  More marked, the security from risk measure (Qui Score) has a negative 
and  highly elastic (in the sense of an elasticity greater than unity in absolute value) 
impact on ROSF.  A 10% increase in security from risk leads (other things being 
equal) to an approximately 13% decrease in return on shareholders’ funds.  You do 
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get companies that are very secure (in the case of the Qui Score, which rates on a 100 
point scale, from 0 highest risk to 100 highest security, a score of 81-100), but this 
security, as one would expect, dampens considerably the return (cf. Kahya et al, 2001, 
Lev, 2000). 
   Liquidity, here measured by [current assets-stock ÷ current liabilities], is, like the 
profit margin, positively correlated with ROSF, but a 10% increase in liquidity has 
(approximately) just a 3% positive impact on ROSF.  Gearing, here measured as 
(long-tem liabilities + short-term loan + overdraft) ÷ (share capital + reserves), has a 
mild negative effect on ROSF, with a 10% increase in gearing leading to just a 1.5% 
decrease in ROSF.  We can see from the summary statistics in Table 1 that venture 
backed firms can be quite highly geared, as the mean value is 164%.  However, the 
reciprocal of the coefficient of variation (σ/µ) is quite low at 164.47 ÷ 404.61 ≈ 0.406, 
as gearing has a lot of variation in the sample, indeed, from zero to several thousand, 
across firms and years.  It is by no means obvious that a Miller-Modigliani world is 
relevant here.  Indeed, gearing policies do seem to vary widely across companies.  
One explanation for this is that optimal gearing trajectories can, in theory, take 
diverse forms, depending on the characteristics of the firm, and its stage in the life-
cycle (Hilten, Kort and Loon, 1993), Reid (2003). 
   One feature of relevance to company characteristics is risk-class.  In our case, our 
proxy for risk is obtained from the Qui Score, which has a metric which is the 
reciprocal of risk.  Optimality of gearing trajectory is defined for a specific risk class, 
and for this sample a wide variety of risk classes is represented, which again will lead 
to wide variation in gearing policy. 
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Table 3:  Tukey Trimean Estimation 
Independent Variables βˆ  t-ratio Elasticity 
Profit Margin 3.967 60.88*** 1.132 
Liquidity 5.129 7.913*** 0.307 
Gearing -0.0457 -10.55*** -0.191 
Qui Score -0.585 -12.27*** -1.540 
Constant 29.424 10.93*** 1.222 
 
***Significant at 1% level (148 d.f.) 
Dependent Variable: ROSF 
Mean of ROSF = 24.074 
 
 
   An alternative to the LAE estimator is represented in Table 3.  It involves use of the 
Tukey trimean estimator [Rosenberger and Gasko (1983)], the trimean being a  
measure of central tendency, based on the arithmetic average of the values of the first 
quartile, the third quartile, and the median counted twice. Tukey’s estimator is based 
on a linear function of regression quantiles of the form ( ) ( )∑=
i
iiw θβpiβ ˆˆ  where the 
wi are a symmetric weighting scheme.  In this case, the vectors θ and  w were 
assigned values (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) and (0.25, 0.5, 0.25) respectively.  Convergence was 
obtained, using the simplex algorithm, in eighteen sample iterations. 
   It can be seen that the results in Table 3 confirm the earlier results of Table 2, and 
comments about them in Table 2 largely carry over to Table 3. The more 
sophisticated Tukey trimean estimation slightly changes the coefficients of β and the 
value of the elasticities at the means, and the statistical significance has risen for all 
regression coefficients.  However, all regression coefficients remain of the same sign, 
and the order of magnitude (and, indeed, the relative magnitude) of regression 
coefficients, have been little changed.  If anything, elasticties have increased 
somewhat, and predicted consequences for ROSF of percentage changes of 
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independent variables have risen, notably for the profit margin and for the Qui Score.  
The results of Table 2 and Table 3 together increase our confidence in the robustness 
of the results reported. 
   For the sample of firms used (viz. the base period sample of Reid’s (1998) study, 
updated to the present day), the proportion of high and low performances is indicated 
in Table 4.  Thus, not only are some firms in the low performance category, they are 
ubiquitous in their appearance in this category.  For example, Firms T01 (left hand 
column) is a biotechnology firm with persistently poor performance over much of the 
sample period (over two decades).  Contrariwise, Firm T02 (right hand column) is a 
company for a radio station which has enjoyed a persistently good performance over 
much of the sample period. 
   Using the mean of the dependent variable ROSF in the models of Tables 2 and 3, we 
also, of course, can split the sample of firms into high and low performers, as in Table 
4.  This is to use a rather more stringent condition than using the mean of ROSF from 
the summary statistics of Table 1, as in Table 4.  If the mean from Table 1 (viz. ROSF 
= 17.99% – see Table 4) is used for the sample split, then four firms (L, P, T02, T13) 
were always only in the high performing category, and six firms (D, J, J2, T01, T08, 
T14) were always only in the low performing category.  This same sample split held if 
ROCE were used (with ROCE = 17.42% as the hurdle performance rate).  The top 
performing group is not modified if one moves to the more stringent splitting criterion 
of Table 2 and 3, namely ROCE = 24.07%.  Two of the lowest performing firms (PPL 
and Shield) examined (on a case study level) later in the paper would be the lowest 
performers under both sample splits.  Further, the splits would retain these firms in the 
lowest performance category under each of the ROSF and ROCE measures (and 
both). 
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Table 4:  Proportion of High or Low Performance 
LOW (ROSF ≤ 17.99%) HIGH (ROSF > 17.99%) 
FIRM ID % FIRM ID % 
D 9 E 7.5 
E 2.8 F 0.8 
F 4.6 G 6.7 
G 3.7 H 3.3 
H 9.2 K 2.5 
J 6.4 L 2.5 
J2 7.3 M 0.8 
K 3.7 N 3.3 
M 4.6 P 3.3 
N 3.7 P2 4.2 
P2 6.4 Q 9.2 
Q 2.8 R 5.0 
R 2.8 T02 10.8 
T01 12.8 T03 9.2 
T03 1.8 T05 3.3 
T05 3.7 T10 10.0 
T08 2.8 T11 1.7 
T10 0.9 T12 2.5 
T11 11.0 T13 11.7 
T12 4.6 T15 1.7 
T14 1.8   
T15 1.8   
TOTAL 100 TOTAL 100 
 
 
   Essentially, the evidence is that only a small number of firms have shown 
consistently good performance over the sample period.  In the middle is a mixed 
group which has, as one might expect, experienced the highs and lows of good and 
bad fortunes.  Finally, there is a third group of firms, proportionately quite numerous 
(27%) which, throughout the period, have had only low performance.  From this 
group, we have selected two for further case study analysis, Pharmaceutical Proteins 
and Shield Diagnostics, both of which have enjoyed great celebrity, but both of which 
have had disappointingly (and persistently) low performance. 
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4.  Case Studies 
Two illustrative case studies are given below, as an indication of the types of 
companies in which venture capitalists in the UK were investing in the early 1990s.  
Both were extremely promising high-technology companies.  The first, PPL 
Therapeutics (Scotland) Limited (PPL), was involved in early cloning and transgenic 
technology development.  The second, Shield Diagnostics Limited (Shield), hoped to 
develop tests for HIV and AIDS.  As we shall see, each suffered through the failure of 
technologies to achieve milestones in development and, ultimately, through not 
achieving the high hurdle rates of return imposed by venture capital investors.  
   It is possible to link directly the model of equations 1 to 3 (and results of Tables 2 to 
4) above, to the specific performance attributes of the firms chosen for the case study 
analysis, namely PPL (Firm J) and Shield (Firm J2).  Table 5 provides information on 
both the dependent variables (ROSF) and the independent variables (Profit Margin, 
Liquidity, Gearing, Qui Score) of the model, as applied to these two cases.  
   We note, first, that performance was both choppy, and frequently poor, as measured 
by ROSF, for both PPL and Shield.  At Worst, PPL had a ROSF of  - 944.64%  in 
1998; and Shield a ROSF of  - 459.45%  in 2000.  Only rarely was ROSF even 
positive for either firm,  and the best annual ROSF of either firm (15.86% for Shield 
in 1996) was itself below the sample average of 17.99%. 
   Second, we note that the explanatory variables of our model, on the capital structure 
side, all remorselessly suggest corporate financial stress for both firms.  The Profit 
Margin is rarely reported for PPL, and is positive just once, at 1.59% and then 
negative at - 30.99%.  Shield usually did report the profit margin, but it was rarely 
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positive, and Shield’s average for the sample period was - 24.63%.  A similar general 
picture is found with Liquidity, which declined on average for PPL over the sample  
Table 5: Key Financial Variables for PPL and Shield 
ID Year Return on 
Shareholders’ Funds 
Profit 
Margin 
Liquidity Gearing Qui Score 
I. PPL Therapeutics 
J 1992 .31 1.59 8.10 5.64 78.00 
J 1993 -32.60 N 5.75 8.15 46.00 
J 1994 -40.11 N 9.38 61.20 46.00 
J 1995 -31.55 -30.39 7.57 286.67 46.00 
J 1996 N N 4.13 3853.43 19.00 
J 1997 N N .58 2606.46 9.00 
J 1998 -944.64 N .37 849.68 13.00 
J 1999 N N .36 2853.58 8.00 
J 2000 N N 1.34 1242.84 22.00 
J 2001 -243.13 N 4.33 233.33 46.00 
J 2002 -632.89 N 1.24 237.33 32.00 
J 2003 N N 2.10 1143.59 36.00 
 
II. Shield Diagnostics 
J2 1992 -145.18 N .90 57.11 9.00 
J2 1993 -195.06 -38.84 .65 229.09 N 
J2 1994 N -14.80 1.74 N 2.00 
J2 1995 6.73 2.30 2.34 135.37 68.00 
J2 1996 15.86 4.74 2.59 113.42 71.00 
J2 1997 -342.73 -24.30 1.62 403.54 29.00 
J2 1998 N 6.94 1.92 N 26.00 
J2 1999 N -45.23 4.00 N N 
J2 2000 -459.45 -89.35 4.57 704.79 24.00 
J2 2001 N -44.15 2.89 N 1.00 
J2 2002 -32.72 -24.15 7.19 94.72 46.00 
J2 2003 1.07 .72 3.00 111.80 81.00 
 
N = Null return 
 
 
period, sometimes assuming dangerously low values (e.g. 0.36 in 1999), and always 
being relatively low for Shield (rarely more than one standard deviation above the 
sample mean).  For Gearing, that is leverage, the average figure for the sample as a 
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whole is high at 164.47%, as one might expect of the high risk investment 
opportunities in which venture capital is involved.  However, even in a risky world, it 
was exceptional for Gearing to go as high as the peak values of 3853 % (in 1996)and 
705 % (in 2000), for PPL and Shield, respectively, suggesting huge levels of risk, and 
very high probabilities of corporate failure. 
   Indeed, this latter observation is confirmed by the Qui Score variable frequently 
dipping down to levels associated with high risk (e.g. 9 in 1997, 8 in 1999, for PPL; 
and 9 in 1992, 2 in 1994, and 1 in 2001, for Shield).  In eight out of the 11 years for 
which we have data on PPL, the company fell into the ‘high-risk’ or ‘unstable’ 
categories, as defined by Qui.  For Shield, the data are somewhat more turbulent.  Six 
times out of 14 the company was considered to be ‘high risk’ or ‘unstable’, in four of 
our observed years it was considered to be ‘normal’; and in an additional four years it 
was either ‘stable’ or ‘secure’.  The case studies aim to develop a richer empirical 
characterisation of both companies, including qualitative factors which might have 
contributed to the poor performance levels achieved. 
 
Case Study I: PPL Therapeutics (Scotland) Limited (PPL) 
PPL was started by a group of Edinburgh University research scientists in 1987, as 
Caledonian Transgenics Limited, in order to commercialise the activities of its 
research base.  It soon became known as a leader in the science of transgenic 
production of human proteins.  The company was based at what is now called the 
Roslin Institute, on the outskirts of Edinburgh, the capital of Scotland.  This site 
provided the ideal rural location for a farm in which scientists could to conduct their 
experiments.  They examined  flocks of home-grown sheep and herds of cattle, with 
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the ultimate aim being ‘to save human lives by altering animals so that they produce 
therapeutic proteins’ (The Guardian, 2002, p.7). 
   Early-stage financing was provided in the form of venture capital from the 
Prudential financial services group.  Rather than spend money on developing 
expensive high-tech bio-engineering facilities, PPL aimed to develop a product which 
could, quite simply, be provided from the farmed animals themselves.  With a base 
established in Scotland, and the birth of its first transgenic sheep, Tracy, in 1991, PPL 
merged with an American company, TransPharm Inc, in 1993, thus creating the first 
multinational corporation developing transgenic technologies (PPL, 2004, web-site).  
This facilitated the company’s achieving its first  US patent for transgenic technology 
in 1994.  At around the same time, what had become Pharmaceutical Proteins Ltd 
changed its name to PPL Therapeutics (Scotland) Limited.  This is the name that 
exists today. 
   The year 1996 marked a breakthrough for PPL, when it achieved key commercial 
and technological milestone targets, including listing on the London Stock Exchange, 
the completion of a £7.2m production facility, and the opening of an additional sheep 
breeding and experimentation facility in New Zealand.  PPL Therapeutics Plc became 
the holding company for PPL Therapeutics (Scotland) Limited (and, subsequently, for 
PPL (Holdings) Limited and PPL Genetics Limited) as the group divided its activities 
amongst several companies.  In 1997, PPL’s ‘Dolly the Sheep’ was born, the first 
cloned animal, making the company world-famous and pushing its share price up to 
552p (Freeborn, 1998, p.59).  PPL went on to produce cloned transgenic sheep in 
1997 and cloned transgenic pigs in 2000-2001. 
   Following the furore caused by Dolly’s arrival, both in terms of pushing forward the 
technological envelope, and in promoting serious reflection on new ethical issues, 
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PPL continued to develop its transgenic products.  Although Dolly had been cloned 
successfully, she was not, in a strict sense, transgenic, nor did she have great milk-
producing abilities.  Seeking a more favourable farm setting, PPL started work on its 
East Friesian flock in New Zealand.  This flock was  better able to produce milk in the 
quantities required to make the product financially viable.  A combination of Dolly’s 
genes and East Friesian embryos was developed.  As Dr. Ron James, then Managing 
Director of the company, explained at the time, ‘Dolly was not genetically modified 
to our requirements, she was merely cloned.  These new sheep have been altered by 
us … Without this breakthrough it would have taken years to breed enough sheep 
capable of producing large enough quantities of milk to extract commercially viable 
levels of the chemicals we need to produce drugs’ (Doran, 1997, p.1). 
   Further developments followed.  For example, PPL’s ‘peptide technology’, made 
from the milk of genetically modified animals, was a product aimed at preventing 
excess growth of tissue after operations.  PPL’s scientific methodology meant that it 
could produce the drug more cost-effectively than through, for example, chemical 
processes.  Extending its methodology led to further innovative developments, like 
the company’s GSP-1 peptide (an alternative to insulin) and calcitonin peptide (to 
prevent brittle bones) (Wittett, 2000, p.22).  In 2001, the production of cloned 
‘knockout’ pigs again hit the headlines for PPL.  These animals were born without the 
genes that cause humans to reject transplants, and were thought to have the potential 
for both full organ transplants and therapies for conditions like diabetes (Thomasson, 
2001, p.14). 
   On the face of it, PPL should have been a successful company.  It had strong 
financial backing and appeared to have continued scientific success.  However, as 
Figure 1 shows, after peaking in 1995, turnover continued to fall.  Employment grew 
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steadily until 1999, when cuts had to be made.  However, the most telling line on the 
graph is profit, or increasing losses, which eventually spiralled out of control. 
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Figure 1: PPL turnover, profit and employment 1992-2003 
 
 
   There are a number of factors that could be considered to have contributed to the 
demise of PPL.  First, there were obvious ethical considerations that might limit what 
the company did.  For example, as reported in Doran (1997, p.1), ‘Dr Donald Bruce of 
the Church of Scotland religion and technology project was said to be “very 
disturbed” … that human cloning experiments (were) to begin on the other side of the 
Atlantic’.  The birth of Dolly provoked the then US President Bill Clinton to instruct a 
bioethics commission to report on the implications to society of her existence (Magee, 
2002, p.6).  Further, the anti-abortion activists made PPL’s stem cell research difficult 
to promote and develop market support in the US (Nisse, 2002, p.3).  And finally, 
perhaps even a touch of jealousy was shown on the part of the Americans who, 
according to Ron James, ‘didn’t see it coming, and as far as American are concerned 
they do the best science … (they) have never been able to come to terms with the fact 
that a small village on the outskirts of Edinburgh could achieve that kind of science – 
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on purpose’ (Magee, 2002, p.6).  Perhaps it is such negative publicity that led to 
larger than expected numbers of patients dropping out of recent trials of PPL’s new 
drug for the treatment of emphysema (Birmingham Post, 2002, p.19). 
   Additional problems have also arisen in relation to funding further product 
developments.  The company failed to raise the level of funding it needed through a 
rights issue, and found it increasingly difficult to attract new investors.  The key fund-
raising activity was not helped by the timing coinciding with the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 in the US.  But, as one analyst explained, a possible reason for the 
lack of investor interest was that the diversification strategy of PPL had been 
confusing: ‘I find it a very odd picture now.  They started off doing walking factories 
for new drugs.  Now they’re into stem cell research and even generic 
biopharmaceuticals’ (Clark, 2001, p.21). 
   Contributing factors might be the loss of a key member of the team, Dr Ron James, 
who retired as Chief Executive in 2001.  PPL also found the balance between 
scientific endeavour and commercial viability difficult to manage. For example, 
following stock market listing, they had to reveal price-sensitive information, often 
before the technological milestones had been assessed and published in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals (Daily Telegraph, 2002, p.29).  Their heavy reliance on German 
partners Bayer has also affected their performance. In  2003, Bayer suspended their 
plans to develop PPL’s drugs from sheep milk, leading to the slaughter of hundreds of 
animals (Pfeifer, 2003, p.387).  Together, these problems have forced the company to 
be wound up, or sold, with shareholders now only able to hope for 6p a share, at best. 
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Case Study II: Shield Diagnostics Limited (Shield) 
In 1982 a group of life sciences research workers at Dundee University in Scotland 
launched a company intended to commercialise their work.  It was incorporated as 
Shield Immunologicals Limited.  However, it took another five years, until 1987, 
before the business really began to take off, with investment being drawn in from 
several venture capital companies.  A total of £4.5m was invested, with Apax venture 
capital investors taking the role of lead investor.  The newly funded company became 
Shield Diagnostics Limited.  Shield concentrated on the development and 
manufacture of products, rather than on early or basic research.  Marketing was 
undertaken by the multinational drug companies that bought Shield’s products,  who 
then sold them under their own brand names (Investors Chronicle, 1993). 
   In 1992 Shield purchased two infectious disease products, which were classified in 
the company’s accounts as intangible assets.  These were to be used to test, first of all, 
for chlamydia.  But second, and most important, the company wished to develop tests 
for the cytomegla virus (cmv).  This affects people with weakened immune systems, 
such as organ transplant patients; but most particularly, it poses a serious threat to 
those suffering from AIDS (Dorsey, 1997a).  The Finance Director, when 
interviewed, was excited about the technological and commercial possibilities these 
two acquisitions would offer. 
   By the time of the interview, in 1994, the company was actively selling 14 auto-
immune products, which were being used to give advance warning of conditions such 
as rheumatoid arthritis.  It was also working on the development of a product aimed at 
diagnosing blood clotting. This was intended to be a major breakthrough in the 
treatment of heart disease, and was, at the time, going through clinical trials. 
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   Although the company was loss-making in these early stages, there was optimism 
that it would break even during the year following its stock market listing in 1993 
(Chemical Week, 1993).  Nevertheless, the Investors Chronicle (1993, p.62) was 
cautious about potential ‘speculative’ investments in the company, stating that ‘Shield 
is likely to come to the market in mid-September, valued at about £20m.  Valuing 
such companies for stock market purposes is difficult, as yield and earnings multiple 
considerations do not apply.  Shield has a nice £9.7m bank of tax losses, and little 
debt – this is strictly venture capital country – and the placing will raise £5.5m gross 
for Shield and £500,000 for directors’. 
   In reality, the company continued to make losses until 1995, when it began to make 
small profits (see Figure 2).  It was during 1996 that Shield’s Chairman, Hamish Hale, 
was reported in the press as saying that the company was negotiating a takeover, 
which was likely to require further investment.  To encourage such investment, he 
said that the heart disease programme, which aimed to develop inexpensive diagnostic 
tests for predicting heart attacks, was ‘going very well and very rapidly’ (Durman, 
1996, p.4). 
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Figure 2: Shield turnover, profit and employment 1992-2003 
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   In 1997, Shield was forced to issue a profits warning, stating that the losses it 
expected for the year to 31 March would be ‘outside of the current range of market 
expectations’ (Dorsey, 1997b, p.29).  The reason for these greater than expected 
losses was put down to the reduced sales of the company’s syphilis test and the 
writing-off of £387,000 worth of intangible assets.  The latter was the book value of 
the products purchased in 1992 to test for the virus leading to AIDS.  Along with 
declining profits, the company also made 12 staff redundant, in order to reduce 
overheads.  This news hit the company’s share price badly, and its closing price on 23 
January 1997 was well down at 130p. 
   By July 1997, Shield had acquired for £2.4m a Canadian owned company (TTP 
Corporation), which enabled it to expand its portfolio of diagnostic products.  TTP 
manufactured test products through a sub-contractor in England, and Shield’s 
acquisition gave it the right to these tests and to TTP’s working capital of £50,000 
(Dorsey, 1997a).  At this stage, Shield was also planning the future commercialisation 
of its test for cardiovascular risk (Activated Factor XII (AFT), which they hoped 
might prove to be a better predictor of heart disease than cholesterol-based measures.  
Such optimism moved the company’s share price up to 452.5p. 
   When profits to March 1997 were finally released, they were in fact only slightly 
worse than had been anticipated, at £1.33m, compared to an expected £1m deficit 
(Dorsey, 1997b), but the company’s share price, having been fairly buoyant, fell to 
510p.  A contributing factor to the falling share price was the lack of progress on 
Shield’s development of its diagnostic test AFT.  It was thought that it might take four 
to six months for the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant commercial 
approval of the product.  However, management continued discussions with potential 
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partners, such as Johnson & Johnson and Abbott Laboratories, and remained 
optimistic about future developments. 
   By October 1997, Shield suffered another blow, at the executive level, with the 
unexpected departure of its Managing Director, Gordon Hall.  Rumours abounded that 
he had come under increasing pressure because of a failure to sign a deal to 
commercialise AFT.  The company’s share price fell 97.5p to 620p on the news of his 
departure.  While some blamed the drop on the fact that he had resigned, one sector 
analyst suggested that there was more to it, commenting that ‘AFT is by far the most 
important product at Shield … it is crucial they get approval for this product, and 
crucial they get a good marketing partner on board.  This rumour is suggesting that 
Gordon Hall was not making as much progress with that agreement as perhaps the 
company would have hoped and they really want to move him now because it is the 
rest of the Board that will be left with the decision’ (Newton, 1997, 25). 
   Good news finally came for Shield in November 1997, with the rumour that Abbott 
Laboratories, based in Chicago, were close to finalising a deal to commercialise their 
AFT test.  Shares rose to 697.5p at this good news (Newman, 1997).  A year later, the 
newly-named Afecta test was set to launch on the market, having received approval 
from the FDAA in September 1998.  The share price stood at 610p.  A further 
product, testing for homocysteine, also aimed at testing for cardiovascular disease, 
was undergoing development.  Each of these two tests were thought to be so-called 
commercial  ‘blockbusters’, with the potential for global sales of over $1bn (Stokes, 
1998, p.1). 
   After a long, slow start to life, by 2003, the company was looking forward to 
breaking into profit.  Having merged with Axis Biochemicals in May 1999, and now 
called Axis-Shield, turnover was beginning to grow steadily (see Fig.2).  Research 
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published in the New England Journal of Medicine gave encouraging support to the 
company’s work on testing for homocysteine, which was linked to dementia and 
Alzheimer’s disease.  The Finance Director explained that ‘previously our 
homocysteine product has been used in cases of cardio disorder.  Now it could be 
used for a much wider market’ Murray-Watson (2002, p.3).  The company was now 
valued  over £152m. 
   In June 2003, news broke that Axis-Shield had signed a major deal with Abbott 
Laboratories to develop 12 new tests for cardiovascular and other major diseases.  
According to the company’s Chief Executive, the deal was expected to ‘provide a 
significant future revenue stream for Axis-Shield’ (Mackie, 2003, p.8).  During 2004, 
Axis-Shield notified shareholders of the legal action it was pursuing against two US 
based companies, for infringement of their patents concerning the detection of heart 
conditions.  While such action was obviously expensive, and potentially threatening 
to the very existence of the company, a satisfactory deal was arranged whereby Axis-
Shield gained control of the technology, but would receive royalties on sales made by 
its rival.  As Axis-Shield’s Finance Director explained, ‘no money is going to be 
changing hands as a result of this deal.  We’ve now licensed this company, Catch, and 
will receive royalty payments from them, but we’ve also acquired worldwide 
exclusive rights for this technology.  While it was infringing on our patent, it is good 
technology and is a good addition to the portfolio’ (Dey, 2004, p.27). 
   After a turbulent few years, therefore, life for Axis-Shield begins to look better.  
Pre-tax losses to end June 2004 were down to £886,000 from £4.3 million the year 
before.  Having dropped the controversial and unsuccessful AIDS diagnostics, the 
company now focuses it activities on tests for cardiovascular and neurological 
diseases, rheumatoid arthritis and diabetes.  With renewed optimism, the chairman 
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stated that ‘our current products should produce strong growth and this will be 
supported by a substantial number of new products over the coming years’ (Aberdeen 
Press and Journal, 2004, p.20). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We have demonstrated how, in a technical sense, it is possible to create a robust 
model of long-run performance for SMEs which have received venture capital 
backing early in their life cycles.  A key model which we expounded explained return 
on shareholders’ funds in terms of profit margin, liquidity, gearing and risk.  This 
model was shown to be robust.  However, such models may not capture the 
essentially flawed features of low performing venture backed firms.  Two case studies 
are used to illustrate how failures to hit research milestones were crucial causes of 
long-term low performance for two venture-backed high-technology companies.  
Thus, it may not be possible to ‘financially engineer’ a development company out of 
poor economic performance, if its scientific capability is not as dynamic as expected.  
This may not be entirely the venture capitalist’s fault, but it provides stark counter-
examples to the general claim that the consequences of continued and large venture 
capital support are always efficacious. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
employ  total employment 
gear   gearing (expressed as  %) 
  (long term liabilities + short term loans & overdraft)/ (share capital + reserves) 
liquid  liquidity ratio 
  (current assets-stock)/ current liabilities 
profmarg profit margin (%) 
quisc  Qui Score (see below) 
quirat  Qui Rating - another measure of the Qui Score 
roce   return on capital employed (expressed as a %) 
Profit before tax/ net assets (fixed + current assets – current liabilities) 
rosf  return on shareholder funds (expressed as a %) 
Profit before tax/ shareholders funds 
 
The QuiScore 
The QuiScore is a measure of the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the 
date of calculation.  It is given as a number in the range 0 to 100.  For ease of interpretation, that range 
may be considered as comprising five distinct bands. 
 
81-100  The Secure Band 
Companies in this sector tend to be large and successful public companies.  Failure is very unusual and 
normally occurs only as a result of exceptional changes within the company or its market. 
 
61-80  The Stable Band 
Here again, company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about if there are major company 
or marketplace changes. 
 
41-60  The Normal Band 
This sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some that do. 
 
21-40  The Unstable Band 
Here, as the name suggests, there is a significant risk of company failure: in fact, companies in this 
band are, on average, four times more likely to fail than those in the Normal Band. 
 
0-20  The High Risk Band 
Companies in the High Risk sector may have difficulties in continuing trading unless significant 
remedial action is undertaken, there is support from a parent company, or special circumstances apply.  
A low score does not mean that failure is inevitable. 
 
Source: Qui Credit Assessment Limited (1999). 
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